Maritime Violence is a complex "ecosystem" of threats and responses, connected in ways that governments might not fully appreciate. Each component benefits directly or indirectly from violence in the maritime domain. The Introduction explains how each subsequent chapter contributes to the notion that maritime violence, though challenging, can be managed.
Although relatively rare in history, maritime terrorism presents the possibility of catastrophic damage to critical infrastructure and key resources on or near the sea. All governments lack the resources to deal with such threats, and they must decide whether to use what they have to prevent terrorism or to manage more common but less spectacular forms of maritime violence.
Since no government has enough resources to protect everything, each must have a method of choosing which pieces of critical infrastructure to reinforce and which ones can be assigned lower levels of security. This chapter suggests a target analysis model that terrorists might use to decide what to attack. Maritime security officials can use the analysis to "think like a terrorist" before they determine how to distribute precious defensive resources. This methodology combines the intelligence gathered from analyzing threat groups with the wisdom of knowing ourselves.
Armed Maritime Crime. This chapter introduces a new term: "Armed Maritime Crime." Such an umbrella term was needed to remove the ambiguity caused by different definitions of piracy (the IMO includes sea robbery but UNCLOS does not). Armed maritime crime is discussed here in contrast to other maritime crimes that do not involve direct action against individuals. Clarification of these terms paves the way for a useful discussion of maritime violence in the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, and Southeast Asia. The chapter finishes with an evaluation of the efficacy of armed security guards to prevent Armed Maritime Crime.
The act of developing a 'whole of government' strategy against maritime violence is a function that forces institutions to coordinate their activities – with each other and with foreign counterparts. Every government has a variety of instruments they can use in various combinations to achieve desired outcomes. Those strategies must target the root causes of maritime violence, active threat groups, and the vulnerabilities all governments have relative to the threats. Finally, strategy must be evaluated through a process of measurement; then adjusted according to what works best.
Maritime Security is a subset of the broad set of activities sometimes called Maritime Governance. In order to create a climate of security in the maritime domain, governments must discharge all of the functions and sub-functions of maritime governance, detailed here. The chapter goes on to propose two assessment frameworks for evaluating maritime governance, called "Level I" and "Level II." The bottom line is that effective maritime security requires both governance and capacity, a combination for which this analysis works best.
The importance of port security is too often overlooked in the examination of maritime security. Ports are the critical nodes of maritime trade, which accounts for between 80% and 90% of world trade. Most of a country's maritime critical infrastructure is located within port areas, and commerce is vulnerable at the fixed points ports represent. Included in this chapter are discussions of maritime trade legal provisions that affect all the world's ports, as well as the under-appreciated cyber security threat to port operations.
The UNCLOS Treaty assigns gradually diminishing degrees of sovereignty over maritime space to every country with a coastline out to 200 nautical miles from a "baseline." In order to maintain full sovereignty, then, a government would have to maintain resources sufficient to understand everything that is going on in an impossibly vast maritime domain. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is thus an important goal that only a few governments can accomplish. But every government that wishes to manage maritime violence must do the best it can to achieve complete MDA, fostering coordination among their own institutions and other governments.
Strong, high capacity maritime security institutions need the best leadership possible in order to carry out the roles and missions assigned by elected civilian leaders. Leadership is a matter of style, but the best leaders follow the rules set forth in this chapter, built on a foundation of purpose, vision, trust, and focus. Institutions are more important than individuals, and every member must do what he or she can to strengthen them while they are there. But it is leaders that have the greatest influence over how their institutions perform - during their tenure and after they have moved on.
Reducing maritime violence depends, in large part, on understanding the complicated legal framework that stiches together the global maritime domain. This chapter explains the maritime legal landscape; then imagines what a written legal framework for combating maritime terrorism might look like. There is much evidence here to support the view that all maritime security institutions need legal experts to help them fight maritime violence, both at home and abroad.
The same institutions and processes that governments use for responding to natural disaster and industrial accidents can be adapted to man-made disaster management. It is suggested here that the US "Incident Command System" (ICS) can be useful for any government facing maritime violence threats. The system is logical and basic enough to be adopted by developing countries, but maritime ICS requires resources sufficient to put a significant number of boats on the water.
Sri Lanka fought a brutal insurgency against the LTTE for 30 years before finally defeating them militarily in 2009. The key to that victory was a campaign by the Sri Lankan Navy to locate and sink the international shipping network that supplied LTTE land forces. Using bold leadership and intelligence cooperation with the US and other governments, Sri Lanka brought the war to a halt relatively quickly. This case demonstrates just how bad a maritime threat can become, but it also teaches the value of the maritime domain to both sides in a conflict.
Ten years ago, piracy (and sea robbery) were so rampant in the Strait of Malacca that it occupied the top spot for "piracy" in the world. In the last few years, the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have coordinated actions to suppress piracy in the Strait. The results have been successful in that East and West Africa are now more piracy-prone than Malacca, but challenges remain. This chapter discusses the results – some disappointing - of governments working together on one of the world's biggest maritime challenges.
A series of maritime insurgencies has plagued the Sulu Sea periphery for many years, adding fuel to the struggle for an Islamic nation on the Philippine Island of Mindanao. But political stability in Malaysia and Indonesia has also contributed to the maritime violence witnessed on and near the sea. This chapter catalogues some of this activity, drawing lessons for all maritime governments about how land and sea become interdependent security platforms.
Currently, The Gulf of Guinea has the highest incidence of piracy in the world. This chapter explains that most of what is called "piracy" in the region is mostly armed robbery at sea inside territorial waters (hence the umbrella term 'Armed Maritime Crime'). In addition to violent crimes, drug smuggling and fuel theft are rampant in the Gulf's maritime space. There are more than one dozen countries directly affected by these activities, and they are trying to coordinate their efforts to make the region more secure.
The rationale for a Coast Guard in Yemen is clear. This case explains how Yemen developed a Coast Guard as a new maritime security institution with different roles and missions from the Yemen Navy. Even with the likely breakup of the country into North and South, the case for a Coast Guard remains strong.
Maritime security is described here as a "wicked problem" with no clear set of solutions. It is possible to manage maritime violence and thus minimize the harm to individuals and property, but there are no victories as in war. This chapter ties the book back together and offers ten strategic "precepts" to guide government actions against maritime violence.