Innovation, Transformation, and War


By James A. Russell
Figure 3-1

The disposition of US forces in the Al Qaim region in September 2005 (left) and the spreading out of those forces (right) following the deployment of the 3-6 Marines in the fall of 2005.
Tribal breakdown in Western Anbar in late 2005.
Figure 3-3

Logical lines of operations, or LOOs, developed by 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment in the spring of 2006.
1-7 analyses of the towns in its area of operations according to its LOOs.
Summary of the major elements of “Project Metro” used by 1-7 in adapting law enforcement techniques to its mission in the Al Qaim region.
Figure 3-6

Counterinsurgency methodology developed by 4-14 during its deployment in Anbar in the fall of 2005.
The 4-14 intelligence-operations target fusion cycle used in Anbar in 2005-2006.
Details of 4-14 cache find in Anbar, February 2006.
Summary of 4-14 non-lethal activities during its COIN operations in Anbar.
Figure 4-1

States contributing units to the 2/28 Brigade Combat Team during its deployment to Anbar in 2005 and 2006.
Figure 4-2

The major combat elements of the 1/1 Brigade Combat Team (left) and their scheme of deployment in and around Ramadi in 2006-2007.
The growth of tribal support during 1/1’s deployment in and around Ramadi from June 2006-2007. Green areas represent tribal support; yellow partial support, and red non-supportive
The progression of 1-37’s operations in south central Ramadi is shown in these graphics from left to right as the battalion expanded its control over insurgent neighborhoods in the summer and fall of 2006.
Decisive Point: when barriers and fighting positions at the COP are complete enough to defeat a complex AIF attack.

Key Tasks:
• Seize the buildings that will comprise the COP
• Secure the area around the COP and the route to it to prevent AIF from disrupting construction. Maintain that security until the OP is capable of defeating a complex AIF attack without reinforcement.
• Rapidly move construction and barrier materials to the COP using multiple secure routes.
• Quickly emplace barriers and install life support required to sustain a PLT (+)

Endstate: TF has established a defensible COP with a secure route connecting it to existing TF ASRs.

The 1-37 combat outpost construction standard operating procedure used in the fall of 2006 in Ramadi.
Figure 4-7

The 1-37 “Census Loop” that related census activities to ongoing operations.
The disposition of the different 1-6 elements and its Iraqi partners in joint security stations in central Ramadi in 2006-2007.
Figure 4-9

Removal of rubble around the government center in central Ramadi initiated by 1-6 Marines in 2006-2007.
Details of Operation Okinawa in the spring of 2007 by the ISF and 1-6 Marines.
Details of the first Ramadi district council meeting in March 2007 convened by 1-6 Marines.
Details on the 1-6 information operations program that featured use of loudspeakers in the Ramadi neighborhoods.
Figure 4-14

AIF ATTACK TRENDS IN AO TOPEKA

- IRAQ STUDY GROUP INDICATES SITUATION IN IRAQ IS "GRAVE AND DETERIORATING"; HOWEVER CONDITIONS IN RAMADI INDICATE OTHERWISE
- DIRECT CONTACT (COMPLEX) ATTACK CAPABILITY IS DWINDLING
- MOST COMMONLY USED WEAPON FOR AIF REMAINS IED ATTACKS. THESE, ALTHOUGH DISRUPTIVE, ARE ALSO MOSTLY INEFFECTIVE

RFCT CACHE FINDS

- IRAQIS KNOW WHAT TO LOOK FOR WHEN SEARCHING FOR CACHES
- LOCALS WILL SHARE INFORMATION WITH IP BECAUSE IP ARE FROM THE LOCAL AREA
- THE INFORMANT WILL NOT BE MARKED AS A CF COLLABORATOR FOR TALKING TO IP.
- UNTRAINED IP INVESTIGATION IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN CF INVESTIGATION BY VIRTUE OF LANGUAGE/ CUSTOM BARRIER ALONE

Summary of insurgent activity and cache finds over the course of the 1/1 deployment in Ramadi during 2006 and 2007.
172nd SBCT laydown in Ninewa, Iraq, 2005-2006.
2-1 Campaign plan overview used in operations in Mosul during 2005-2006.
Early Assessment of insurgent control over Mosul Neighborhoods at outset of 172nd COIN operations. Note: AAS is Ansar Al Sunna; QJBR is Tanzim Qa"idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, or Al Qaeda in Iraq—the organization of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi.
Findings of pattern analysis during October 2005 by 2-1 in Eastern Mosul
2-1 Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance plan and its changing map of battle space in November 2005
Figure 5-6

Humint generated by 2-1 following changed handling of detainee questioning from September through October 2005
26 October 2005 directed raids on Al Sharkya IED Cells by 2-1 in Mosul.
Figure 5-8

Roll-up of the “Opel Gang” by 2-1 in the Fall of 2005 in Mosul.
Example of a situational template, or SITEMP, used by 2-1 in the spring of 2006 during its operations in Mosul.
2-1 “Wheel of Stuff” to help guide target decision-making during its deployment.
Figure 5-11

2-1 integrated targeting set in Mosul, January 2006.
Growth of Company C 1-17’s area of operations in its “economy of force mission” in Mosul during the course of its deployment. Blue Stars Are Iraqi IP Stations; Green Stars Iraq Army Facilities
Standard organization of Strkyer company on left vs. the organization on right created by Company C, 1-17 during its deployment in Mosul in 2005-2006.
Example of small kill team operations by Company C, 1-17 in Mosul in May 2006.
The 4-11 Field Artillery area of operations south of Mosul.
The 4-11 integrated assessment of its area of operations. Key: red is negative; green positive; yellow is neutral.
The 4-11 “Targeting Wheel” as it applied to the economic situation in its area of operations.